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The aim of this article is to assess Friedman’s claim, put forward in his 1949 article on the Marshallian demand
curve, that there is a methodological divide between the Marshallian and Walrasian approaches. Friedman’s
argument will be critically examined and compared with the views he expressed in other articles written around
the same time. My evaluation will lead to a mixed conclusion. Positively, Friedman must be hailed for having
brought the Marshall−Walras divide to the forefront. In a more critical vein, I will suggest, first, that Friedman’s
argumentation in the 1949 paper is definitely wanting. A better account of the differences between Marshall and
Walras is to be found in his 1955 review of Jaffé’s translation of Walras’s Élements d’économie pure. Second, I
will claim that Friedman’s real target in his 1949 article was imperfect competition theory à la Chamberlin and
Keynesianism à la Lange, which he wrongly associated with Walrasian theory. Third, present-day proponents of
the divide will be criticised for having naively echoed Friedman’s argumentation instead of having tried to
improve it.
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1.  Introduction
In 1949 Milton Friedman published an article on the Marshallian demand curve (Friedman
([1949] 1953) which is still frequently quoted, less for its main argument than for its short
final section entitled “Alternative conceptions of economic theory” in which he launched a
fierce attack on Walrasian theory. Drawing a contrast between the Marshallian and the
Walrasian approaches, Friedman expressed his regret as to the latter having superseded the
former. In his oft-quoted words, “We curtsy to Marshall but we walk with Walras” (Friedman
[1949] 1953: 89).
Eminent Friedman scholars, such as Roger Backhouse (1997), Mark Blaug (2003), Michael
Bordo and Anna Schwartz (2004), Dan Hammond (1996, 2003), Abraham Hirsch and Neil de
Marchi (1990), Kevin Hoover ([1984] 1990) and Tom Mayer (1993, 2003), have endorsed
Friedman’s  claim  about  the  Marshall−Walras  divide.
1  The  following  quotation  from
Hammond summarises the gist of their argument:
The hallmark of Friedman’s methodology is Marshallianism. With this label he sets his
view apart from the Walrasians’. In the 1940s the differences in the two methodologies
were recognized, and as we have seen, they were not Friedman’s creation. As time
passed, the Walrasian approach ascended to a position of dominance in both micro and
macroeconomics, with the virtues of the general equilibrium approach and mathematical
qualities of elegance and generality taken for granted by most economists (Hammond
1996: 43).
The aim of this paper is to assess the validity of Friedman’s claim, first by studying the
argument offered in Section V of his 1949 article and, second, by comparing it with his other
contemporary  methodological  papers    his reviews of Robert Triffin’s Monopolistic
Competition and General Equilibrium (Friedman 1941) and Oscar Lange’s Price Flexibility
and Employment (Friedman ([1946] 1953), his comment of Christ’s assessment of Lawrence
Klein’s econometric model (1951), his famous “Methodology of Positive Economics” essay
(1953) and finally his review of William Jaffé’s translation of Walras’s Élements d’Économie
Pure (Friedman [1955] 1993).
Most of these papers pursued a critical aim. As will be seen, Friedman had many foes at the
time – the concept of indifference curves, Hicksian demand analysis, Henry Schultz’s, work
aiming  at  measuring  interrelated  demands,  macro-econometric  models  à  la  Klein,
monopolistic competition, Keynesianism à la Lange. To Friedman, the common thread in all
                                       
1 Nonetheless the prevailing view, which can be traced back to Hicks, is that the Marshallian and Walrasian
approaches are complementary.2
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these disliked models was their connection to Walrasian theory. Hence his attack on the latter
– and the commentator’s difficulty in assessing whether his target was Walrasian theory per
se or the models he associated with it. His positive hero was Marshall, whose insights, he felt,
had been unduly discarded, and his indictment of the ‘Walrasian’ models rested on their
alleged departure from the Marshallian agenda.
The questions that I wish to address in this paper ensue from these observations. Was
Friedman right in wanting to draw a contrast between the Marshallian and the Walrasian
approaches? Did he characterise it in an apposite way? Should we follow him when he claims
that the Marshallian programme was good and the Walrasian bad instead of simply opposing
them as alternatives? What did he actually understand by the ‘Walrasian’ modifier? Why was
he so strongly anti-Walrasian in his 1949 article and less so in his 1955 piece?
A complete discussion of these issues must evolve at two levels, concerned respectively with
the ‘politics’ underlying Friedman’s stance and the contents of his arguments. The first is a
tale of a group of Chicago economists (Milton Friedman, George Stigler, W. Allen Wallis and
Aaron Director) gradually taking the reins of the University of Chicago community of
economists, with the aim of implementing a defence of free-market economic liberalism’s
agenda.
2 A twofold offensive, external and internal, was implied. The external fight opposed
Chicago  and  Harvard  and  concerned  the  relevance  or  otherwise  of  the  monopolistic
competition theory put forward by Chamberlin.
3 On the internal front, one enemy was
Walrasian theory as upheld within the Department first by Henry Schultz (who died in 1938)
and later by Oscar Lange. Adhesion to the Walrasian approach was also the hallmark of some
prominent economists (such as Tjalling Koopmans, Jacob Marschak and Lawrence Klein) on
the Cowles Commission (which had been relocated in Chicago in 1939). While they were
only residents in the University’s Department of Economics, their presence might be viewed
as a threat to the laisser-faire agenda since, in the wake of the debate on the possibility of
socialism,  Walrasian  theory  was  associated  with  collectivism,  or  at  least  with  social-
democracy. So, when studying what was going on in Chicago in the 1940s and 1950s at the
level of ideology and politics, a possible shorthand answer to the question ‘What did
Friedman mean by ‘Walrasian’?’ is ‘socialism’.
4
While, for all its bluntness, I may sympathise with this interpretation, it does not provide a
complete assessment of the issue. Whatever Friedman’s motivation for entering into the fray
and attacking Walrasian theory, his objections ended up being expressed as theoretical
                                       
2 Cf. Stigler (1988: 150).
3 See Leeson (2000).
4 As stated by Mirowski and Hands, “ In the minds of many at Chicago, Walrasian mathematical theory became
conflated with socialism, crude numerical empiricism, and politically naïve welfare economics” (Mirowski and
Wades, 1998: 268).3
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statements whose intrinsic validity needs to be examined. The shortcoming of Mirowski and
Hands work (Mirowski (2002) and Mirowski and Hands (1998)), which provide vivid
narratives of the contextual-historical dimension, is that they fail to discuss this validity. The
aim of my paper is complementary to theirs, in that its exclusive concern is an assessment of
Friedman’s theoretical arguments.
2. The Marshall−Walras divide in Friedman’s early writings
2.1. Friedman’s 1941 review of Triffin
Triffin’s Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium (1940)  was  based  on  his
doctorate, written under the supervision of Chamberlin. As far as can be judged from its
introduction  and  first  chapter,  its  aim  was  to  integrate  monopolistic  competition  and
Walrasian theory:
Monopolistic and imperfect competition theories have evolved in the United States and
in England alike along the lines of the theoretical tradition dominant in both countries:
the particular equilibrium of Alfred Marshall. What we might well do now is to restate
the whole problem in terms of the Walrasian, general equilibrium system of economic
theory, so much more influential in economic thought on the continent of Europe. We
shall find with happy surprise that monopolistic competition begins to bridge the
canyon which has for years separated two schools of theoretical thought (Triffin 1940:
3).
However, going beyond rhetoric, not much of this programme ended up being realised. While
Triffin’s book contains many scattered references to Walrasian theory, they concern particular
points rather than Walras’s general system. No model of a general equilibrium incorporating
imperfect competition is present. The bulk of the book rather consists of a comparison of
different imperfect competition models. Still, one claim that could not but attract Friedman’s
attention stands out, namely that as soon as product differentiation is introduced the notion of
an industry ceases to be relevant. Only the notions of the firm, on the one hand, and the
economy as a whole, on the other, remain relevant.
In  his  two-page  long  review  of  Triffin’s  book,  Friedman  (1941)  did  not  evoke  the
Marshall−Walras opposition. Actually, Walras’s name was not mentioned. Friedman’s main
complaint was that “Marshallian tools have been thrown away too light-heartedly” by
imperfect competition theorists (1941: 390). He had in mind the notion of industry. While,
like Triffin, he considered the notions of monopolistic competition and industry antagonistic,
he drew the opposite conclusion  for Friedman,  the  notion of monopolistic competition
had to be abandoned and that of industry maintained. The underlying reason was his enduring4
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concern for practical issues. The latter, he believed, were to be grasped at the level of the
industry instead of that of the firm or the economy as a whole (Hammond 2003).
2.2. Friedman’s 1946 review of Lange’s Price Flexibility and Employment
The aim of Lange’s (1944) book, whose inspiration was Hicks’ Value and Capital (1939;
second edition 1946), was to examine the Keynesian issue of whether a decrease in the money
wage could restore full employment in the face of involuntary unemployment. Lange’s
interest lay in the persistence of under-employment, rather than in the study of the logical
existence of a state of equilibrium with involuntary unemployment. Not surprisingly, his
conclusion was that Keynes had been right:
Only under very special conditions does price flexibility result in the automatic
maintenance or restoration of equilibrium of demand for and supply of factors of
production (Lange, 1944: 83).
Lange’s book started with a rejection of partial equilibrium analysis on the grounds of its
narrow range of validity. Although Lange did not refer to the industry notion, it is clear that
he had no sympathy for it. This was certainly not be to please Friedman. Yet his criticism was
not directly addressed to this point. Rather Friedman wanted to indict Lange’s analysis, for
consisting of “empty tautologies” or being mere “taxonomic theorising” ([1946] 1953: 277).
He concluded  that Lange was just “enumerating theoretical possibilities, not describing the
real world” ([1946] 1953: 271) and that his work lacked any empirical anchorage  no fact-
gathering at the initial stage of the inquiry, no refutable predictions at its end stage.
Lange largely dispenses with the initial step  a   full and comprehensive set of
observed and related facts to be generalised  and in the main reaches conclusions no
observed facts can contradict. His emphasis is on the formal structure of the theory, the
logical interrelations of the parts. He considers it largely unnecessary to test the validity
of his theoretical structure except for conformity to the canons of formal logic. His
categories are selected primarily to facilitate logical analysis, not empirical application
or test. (Friedman [1946] 1953:283).
This was the very criticism that Friedman was later to address to the Walrasian approach. Yet
at this juncture, no reference was made to Walras.
A further, yet less emphasised, reason for Friedman’s dissatisfaction with Lange’s work
concerned its policy conclusion. In Lange’s paper, general equilibrium theory was used as a
vehicle for making a Keynesian case. That general equilibrium might serve the purpose of
dismissing the working of the invisible hand did not bode well for it in Friedman’s eyes.5
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2.3. Friedman’s 1949 paper on the Marshallian demand curve
Like the Triffin review, Friedman’s 1949 paper on the Marshallian demand curve was a
complaint about the turn taken by economic theory, a regret as to Marshallian tools being
thrown away too airily.
5 The object of Friedman’s dissatisfaction was the mutation that
Marshallian demand theory had undergone. He felt that the newly prevailing interpretation of
the Marshallian demand curve was unsatisfactory and needed to be replaced by an alternative
more faithful to Marshall’s interpretation.
The currently accepted interpretation can be read into Marshall only by a liberal – and, I
think, strained – reading of his remarks, and its acceptance implicitly convicts him of
logical inconsistency and mathematical error at the very foundation of his theory of
demand. More important, the alternative interpretation of the demand curve that is
yielded by a literal reading of his remarks not only leaves his original work on the theory
of demand free from both logical inconsistency and mathematical error but also is more
useful for the analysis of most economic problems. (Friedman [1949] 1953: 48).
While some readers may be at a loss to see who Friedman had in mind when speaking of the
‘current interpretation,’ his target was actually well defined: the ideas developed by Hicks in
his analysis of demand in part I of Value and Capital and expanding on Hicks and Allen
(1934), on the one hand, and Henry Schultz’s work (his 1935 article his book, The Theory and
Measurement  of  Demand (1938)), on the other. Both Hicks and Allen, and Schultz had
independently rediscovered views that had been put forward by Slutsky’s in a 1915 Giornali
degli Economisti article.
6 Hicks’s views soon gained wide recognition. Although Hicks and
Schultz  shared  the  same  insight  about  building  demand  theory  on  the  apparatus  of
indifference curves, they pursued different purposes. While Hicks was interested in pure
theory without aiming at measurement, Schultz’s aim, in contrast, was to make the new
demand theory amenable to empirical testing. Friedman wrote his master’s dissertation at the
University of Chicago under Schultz’s supervision. He was also Schultz’s research assistant
for a year. Yet at the end of the day he barely adhered to Schultz’s views.
7 He was not alone
in this respect. Critiques of Hicks’s conception had already been delivered by Stigler (1939)
and Knight (1944),
8 and in the 1942 Festschrift edited by Lange et al. in memory of Schultz,
                                       
5 This theme is also visible in Friedman’s lecture notes for his 1940s Economics courses at the University of
Chicago (Hammond 1996: 31).
6 For a study of the relationship between these authors, see Chipman and Lenfant (2002) and Moscati (2004).
7 Hammond (1992: 223) gives a vivid account of Friedman’s opinion of Schultz. See also Stephen Stigler (1994:
1200).
8 Knight introduced his paper as follows: “The objective of this paper is largely negative — to criticise certain
recent innovations in the treatment of demand which have been generally hailed as representing an advance but
which, in the writer’s opinion, constitute a movement in a backward direction. The particular reference is to the6
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Friedman  himself  had  already  written  an  article  (jointly  with  Wallis)  criticising  the
indifference curve notion (Wallis and Friedman, 1942).
Hicks’ aim was to re-build the Marshallian theory of demand while disposing of the idea of
diminishing marginal utility. Beginning with the case of two goods, Hicks studied the effect
of the variation in the price of X on the demand for Y, the nominal income of the agent under
study being fixed. The renown distinction between the substitution effect and the income
effect ensued. The analysis was subsequently extended to the case of a great number of goods.
The contrast drawn by Friedman between the Hicksian reconstruction of Marshallian theory
and what he believed to be its proper interpretation is as follows. In Hicks’ model the money
income and the price of every other commodity is fixed, on top, of course, of tastes and
preferences. The real income is changing due to the eponymous effect. In contrast, Friedman
argues that the real income should be considered fixed as well as the price of all close
substitutes for and complements of the commodity considered that. Whenever a change in the
price of the good considered occurs, the average level of prices of unrelated goods needs to be
changed in such a way as to freeze the purchasing power of money. Adopting Friedman’ s
stance amounts to eliminating the income effect, thus leaving only the substitution effect to be
active. Therefore, the Marshallian demand curve à la Friedman is necessarily negatively
sloped, what is untrue fro the Hicksian demand curve.
Friedman was critical of the indifference curve apparatus in general, but his precise target was
its use by Hicks, i.e. employing the substitution effect while keeping utility constant – that is,
the consumer is compensated by just enough money to bringing him or her back to his or her
initial indifference curve. Friedman dismissed this view on the grounds that indifference
curves were not an observable phenomenon. In contrast, he endorsed Slutsky’s formulation,
where the substitution effect gives the agent enough money to get back to his or her initial
level of consumption. Slutsky was thereby tilted towards Marshall’s side.
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In defence of his interpretation, Friedman  claimed that it was more modest (“because it does
not try to take account of all prices in the system, not even by keeping them constant” (Yeager
1960: 54)) and more “useful” than its rival when it came to practical problems.
A demand function containing as separate variables the prices of a rigidly defined and
exhaustive list of commodities, all on the same footing, seems largely foreign to this
                                                                                                                          
treatment of demand and utility by J.R. Hicks, pioneered by E. Slutsky, and also followed, and more or less
independently worked out, by Henry Schultz and many others” (1944: 289).
9 “On my interpretation, Marshall’s demand curve is identical with the constructions introduced by Slutsky in his
famous paper on the theory of choice, namely, the reaction of quantity demanded to a ‘compensated variation of
price’, that is, to a variation in price accompanied by a compensating change in money income. Slutsky
expressed the compensating change in money income in terms of observable phenomena, taking it as equal to a
change in price times the quantity demanded at the initial price” ([1949] 1953: 52-3).7
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[Marshallian] approach. It may be a useful expository device to bring home the mutual
interdependence of economic phenomena; itcannot form part of Marshall’s “engine for
the discovery of concrete truth”. The analyst who attacks a concrete problem can take
explicit account of only a limited number of factors; he will inevitably separate
commodities  that  are  closely  related  to  the  one  immediately  under  study  from
commodities that are more distantly related (Friedman [1949] 1953: 57).
10
Friedman went to great lengths to convince his readers that his interpretation was more
faithful to Marshall than the Hicksian one. In effect, most of the paper is devoted to this task.
While I doubt that Friedman was able to make the point, I will shrink from entering into this
issue, and turn at once to the paper’s penultimate section.
 11
For all its brevity, Section V develops several distinct themes. Instead of trying to paraphrase
what Friedman wrote, I find it preferable to quote at length from this section.
A difference in purpose and method between Marshall and Walras
The important distinction between the conceptions of economic theory implicit in
Marshall and Walras lies in the purpose for which the theory is constructed and used. To
Marshall  to repeat an expression quoted earlier  economic theory is “an engine for
the discovery of concrete truth”. … Economic theory, in this view, has two intermingled
roles; to provide “systematic and organised methods of reasoning” about economic
problems; to provide a body of substantive hypotheses, based on factual evidence, about
the “manner of action of causes”. In both roles the test of the theory is its value in
explaining  facts,  in  predicting  the  consequences  of  changes  in  the  economic
environment.  Abstractness,  generality,  mathematical  elegance   these are all
secondary, themselves to be judged by the test of application. The counting of equations
and unknowns is a check on the completeness of reasoning, the beginning of the
analysis, not an end in itself. Doubtless most modern economic theorists would accept
these general statements of the objective of economic theory. But our work belies our
profession (Friedman [1949] 1953: 90).
Friedman’s indictment of the Walrasian approach
According to Friedman, the Walrasian approach must be indicted on several grounds:
                                       
10 See also Friedman ([1949] 1953: 85 and 91).
11 Let me nonetheless give a quotation from Aldrich that is rather dismissive: “Friedman’s essay did not generate
new economic theory but it established Marshall’s demand theory as a topic for historians of economic thought.
Its bold thesis and its detailed attention to what ‘Marshall really meant’ were provocative. It set a pattern: the
subject text is tortured until a confession is produced that can be corroborated by modern theory” (1996: 212).8
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(a) Means  i.e. “abstractness, generality, and mathematical elegance”  have become ends
in themselves (Friedman [1949] 1953: 91).
(b)  The  Walrasian  approach  is  flawed  because  it  gives  precedence  to  the  realism  of
assumptions over their predictive ability:
Facts are to be described, not explained. Theory is to be tested by the accuracy of its
“assumptions” as photographic descriptions of reality, not by the correctness of the
predictions that can be derived from it (Friedman [1949] 1953: 91)
(c) It eliminates the industry notion and takes the monopolistic competition line, a blind alley:
From the “ Walrasian” viewpoint, to take another example from recent developments in
economic theory, it is a gain to eliminate the concept of an “industry”, to take the
individual firm as the unit of analysis, to treat each firm as a monopoly, to confine all
analysis to either the economics of the individual firm or to the general equilibrium
analysis of the economy as a whole. From the Marshallian viewpoint this logical
terminus of monopolistic competition analysis is a blind alley. Its categories are rigid,
determined not by the problem at hand but by mathematical considerations. It yields no
predictions, summarises no empirical generalisations, provides no useful framework of
analysis. (Friedman [1949] 1953: 91-92).
The  difference  between  the  two  approaches  is  not  a  matter  of  partial  versus  general
equilibrium
The distinction commonly drawn between Marshall and Walras is that Marshall dealt
with “partial equilibrium”, Walras with “general equilibrium”. This distinction is, I
believe,  false  and  unimportant.  Marshall  and  Walras  alike  dealt  with  general
equilibrium; partial equilibrium as usually conceived is but a special kind of general
equilibrium analysis  unless, indeed, partial equilibrium analysis is taken to mean
erroneous general equilibrium analysis. Marshall wrote to J. B. Clark in 1908: “My
whole life has been and will be given to presenting in realistic form as much as I can of
my Note XXI”. Note XXI, essentially unchanged from the first edition of the Principles
to the last, presents a system of equations of general equilibrium (Friedman [1949]
1953: 90).
Praising Keynes
Section V ends with Friedman praising Keynes on the ground that he was a real Marshallian:
Of course, it would be an overstatement to characterise all modern economic theory as9
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“Walrasian” in this sense. For example, Keynes’s theory of employment, whatever its
merits  or  demerits  on  other  grounds,  is  Marshallian  in  method.  It  is  a  general
equilibrium theory containing important empirical content and constructed to facilitate
meaningful prediction (Friedman [1949] 1953: 92)
2.4. Friedman’s 1951 Comments on Christ’s article
In a paper presented at a NBER Conference on Business Cycles, Christ (Christ 1951) set
himself the task of testing Klein’s econometric model. The conclusions he reached were
rather negative.
Friedman’s comment on it is interesting for my purposes, because he took the opportunity to
plead against using simultaneous equation models aiming at representing an entire economy
to make short-term predictions. In Friedman’s eyes, Christ has shown that Klein’s model was
a failure. This was music to his ears. He then raised the question of what to do next. “Does it
not then follow that despite the unsatisfactory results to date, the appropriate procedure is to
continue trying one after another of such systems [of general equilibrium] until one that works
is discovered?” (Friedman 1951: 112). No, was his answer, for “the probability that such a
process [of constructing a model for the economy as a whole] will yield a meaningful result
seems to me almost negligible” ((Friedman 1951: 113). Instead, his proposed line was to
return to the study of  industries:
The direction of work that seems to me to offer most hope for laying a foundation for a
workable theory of change is the analysis of parts of the economy in the hope that we
can find bits of order here and there and gradually combine these bits into a systematic
picture of the whole. In the language of model builders, I believe our chief hope is to
study  the  sections  covered  by  individual  structural  equations  separately  and
independently of the economy ((Friedman 1951: 114).
Friedman might aptly have evoked the names of Walras and Marshall in this discussion. In
effect, studying the individual structural equations separately was nothing else than doing
Marshallian industry analysis, while Klein’s attempt at grasping the economy as a whole
suggested a Walrasian affiliation. Yet he did not do so.
2.5.  The  1953 “Methodology of Positive Economics” Essay
While the Marshall−Walras opposition was not mentioned in Friedman’s celebrated 1953
paper, two related themes were nonetheless broached. First, Friedman engaged in a criticism
of empty tautologies, taking up the theme developed in his Lange paper ([1946], 1953).
Second, as in the Triffin review (1941), he crossed swords with imperfect competition theory.10
10
12 It is to the latter that he resorted when criticising the realism of assumptions view:
The relevant question to ask about the “assumptions” of a theory is not whether they are
descriptively “realistic” for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good
approximations for the purpose in hand. And this question can be answered only by
seeing whether the theory works, which means whether its yields sufficiently accurate
predictions. … The theory of monopolistic and imperfect competition is one example of
the neglect in economic theory of these propositions. The development of this analysis
was explicitly motivated, and its wide acceptance and approval largely explained, by the
belief that that the assumptions of “perfect competition” or “perfect monopoly” said to
underlie neoclassical economic theory are a false image of reality. And this belief was
itself based almost entirely on the directly perceived descriptive inaccuracy of the
assumption rather than on any recognised contradiction of predictions derived from
neoclassical economic theory (Friedman, 1953: 15).
2.6. Friedman’s 1955 review of Jaffé’s translation of Walras’s Elements
Friedman’s tone regarding Walrasian theory is more positive here than in his Marshallian
demand curve article, as witnessed by the following statement: “The Elements is a great work
which marked an important step forward in the development of economics as a science”
(Friedman, [1955], 1993: 19).  His review started with the recognition that Walras was
pursuing an aim different from Marshal’s  to “give a bird’s eye-view of the economic
system as a whole” instead of trying to solve concrete issues  yet of no lesser importance.
Walras solved a different, though no less important, problem. He emptied Cournot’s
problem of its empirical content and produced a “complete and rigorous” solution “in
principle”, making no pretence that it could be used directly in numerical calculations.
His problem is a problem of form, not of content: of displaying an idealised picture of
the economic system, not of constructing an engine for analysing concrete problems.
His achievement cannot but impress the reader with its beauty, its grandeur, its
architectonic structure; it would verge on the ludicrous to describe it as a demonstration
of how to calculate the numerical solution to a numerically specified set of equations
(1955: 23-4).
13
                                       
12 According to Leeson, “his methodology of positive economics was formulated as a “reaction” to Robinson and
Chamberlin” (2000: 62). On this, see also Hammond (2003: 13 and seq.).
13 The same more balanced view is to be found in his 1974 “Comments on the critics” (Friedman, 1974: 145-6).
Amongst the different assessments of Walrasian theory that were written on the occasion of Jaffé’s translation
(Bridel 1996), some took a harsher position than Friedman. Harrod’s review is a striking example: “… Almost
all those general qualities that made Marshall’s Principles a great classic, despite the fact that its original
contributions to pure theory are admittedly limited, are lacking in Walras. He had little regard for the actual11
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Walras was thus to be credited with having given economists “a framework for organising
their ideas”. Nonetheless, it was time, Friedman claimed, to return to the more serious
business of “meaningful theory” (1955: 27).
Substantive hypotheses about economic phenomena of the kind that were the goal of
Cournot are an essential ingredient of a fruitful and meaningful economic theory.
Walras  has  little  to  contribute  in  this  direction;  for  this  we  must  turn  to  other
economists, notably, of course, Alfred Marshall. … All these [factors] have combined to
favour the Walrasian emphasis on form, to make it seem not only an essential part of a
full-blown economic theory, but that economic theory itself. This conception  or
misconception  of economic theory has helped to produce an economics that is far
better equipped in respect of form than substance. In consequence, the major work that
needs now to be done is Marshallian rather than Walrasian in character  itself a
tribute to Walras’s impact. (Friedman, 1955: 27).
In writing the above, Friedman fell back on Stigler’s opinion as expressed in Production and
Distribution Theories:
Indeed the general equilibrium theory has contributed little to economic analysis beyond
an emphasis on mutual dependence of economic phenomena: the problems are far too
complicated to be grasped in toto. Yet this particular theory describing the nature of
general equilibrium was essential: such an idea had to appear before rigorous study
could proceed. It was Walras’s greatest contribution — one of the few times in the
history of post-Smithian economics that a fundamentally new idea has emerged (Stigler,
1941: 242).
Note finally that, in spite of his praise to Walras, Friedman still stuck to his ‘empty
tautologies’ indictment, as the following excerpt makes clear:
In his final sentence, Jaffé speaks like a true Walrasian in methodology. One first
constructs a pure theory, somehow on purely formal considerations without introducing
any empirical content; one then turns to the ‘real’ world, fills up the empty boxes,
assigning numerical values to constants, and neglects ‘second-order’ effects at this
stage. As I have argued extensively elsewhere, this seems to me a basically false view.
([1955] 1993: 29, note 6).
                                                                                                                          
phenomena of our economic life, no comprehensiveness, few reservations and little nuance or subtlety. The
presentation is extremely clumsy” (Harrod, 1956: 311).12
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3. Friedman’s subsequent views
Two main claims were made in Friedman’s 1949 article, first that there existed a better
alternative to Hicks’ account of demand theory, second, that the Marshallian and the
Walrasian approaches were poles apart. Since Friedman continued to contribute to economic
theory for almost a century, it worth raising the question as to whether he stuck to his earlier
views. The answer is yes.
As to demand theory, it suffices to turn to the first chapter of his Price Theory essay (1976,
second edition; first edition 1962). It starts with the exposition of the ‘old’ Marshallian
conception of demand and includes the different concepts which Hicks wished to ban. As in
the 1949 article, the ‘ordinary’ demand function is criticised ‘because changes in real income
are not rigorously excluded’ and contrasted with a favoured alternative ‘in which the real
income, in the sense of money income divided by the purchasing power of income, is held
constant’ (1976: 29).
A concession to orthodoxy, Friedman broaches the notion of indifference curves – an
apparatus fiercely criticised in Wallis and Friedman (1942) on the grounds of its separating
preferences form prices and income. Yet when it comes to deriving demand functions from
indifference curves, he falls back on the wedge between Slutsky and Hicks, with the former
being the ‘good’ and the latter the ‘bad guy! Thereby, the earlier contrast between a
conception of demand that is somewhat loose yet lends itself to empirical work and another,
which for all its possible higher rigor fails to do so, turns up again:
The advantage of the Slutsky measure, even though in one sense it is an approximation
which the Hicks measure is not, is that it can be computed directly from observable
market phenomena and behaviour, namely prices and quantities purchased. The Hicks
measure cannot; it requires knowledge of the indifference curves. (1972: 50)
Likewise, there is little doubt that Friedman remained faithful to his earlier views as to the
existence of a divide between Marshall and Walras. Two testimonies suffice to support this
view. The first comes from Friedman’s interview with Snowdon and Vane, one of several
interviews in which he was invited to develop his current views on economics,
Question: Kevin Hoover has drawn a methodological distinction between your work as
Marshallian and that of Robert Lucas as Walrasian. Is that distinction valid?
Answer: There is a great deal to that. On the whole I believe that it is probably true. I
have  always  distinguished  between  the  Marshallian  approach  and  the  Walrasian
approach. I have always been personally a Marshallian. That doesn’t mean that the13
13
Walrasian approach is not a useful or appropriate approach. Peoples’ temperament and
attitudes are different I guess. (Snowdon and Vane: 1997: 202).
14 
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The second testimony is the well-known discussion between Friedman and his critics
organised by Gordon (Friedman 1974). Section 3 of Friedman’s “Comments on the Critics” is
entitled “What explains the difficulty of communication?” (between Tobin and him). His
answer to this question was that “the difficulty is a different approach to the use of economic
theory — the difference between what I termed a Marshallian approach and a Walrasian
approach in an article I wrote many years ago” (1974: 145). Friedman went on quoting
extensively from his 1949 article. Later on, when discussing Patinkin he returned to the same
theme of the contrast between Marshall and Walras:
… Patinkin, even more than Tobin, is Walrasian, concerned with abstract completeness,
rather than Marshallian, concerned with the construction of special tools for special
problems (1974: 159).
4. A criticism of Friedman’s Section V argument
Friedman’s 1949 paper section V raises a host of questions. Had Friedman’s claim that
Walrasian theory dominated the profession any plausibility at the end of the 1940s? Did
Friedman mean that the Marshallian and the Walrasian approaches differed in purpose or in
their implementation of a common purpose? Was Friedman right when stating that the divide
was not a matter of partial versus general equilibrium? Can his portrait of the Walrasian
                                       
14 Lucas concurred wirth such an assessment as his own interview by the same authors testifies “Question [to
Lucas]: You acknowledge that Friedman has had a great influence on you, yet his methodological approach is
completely different to your own approach to macroeconomics. Why did his methodological approach not appeal
to you? Answer:  I  like  mathematics  and  general  equilibrium  theory.  Friedman  didn’t....  Question: His
methodological approach seems more in keeping with Keynes and Marshall. Answer: He describes himself as
Marshallian, although I don’t know quite what it means. Whatever it is, it’s not what I think of myself
(Snowdon and Vane 1998, 132).
15 Unfortunately, when asked to delve into the reasons why he endorsed the Marshall-Walras divide, Friedman’s
testimony has been of little help as the following extract from Hammond’s interview makes clear:
“Hammond: In ‘The Marshallian Demand Curve” you echo Marshall’s description of economic theory as an
‘engine for the discovery of concrete truth’. You compare the Marshallian conception of economic theory with
the Walrasian conception of what theory should be and should do… Do you have a sense of how you first came
to make this distinction and how or why you saw it as important?
Friedman: I don’t really have the sense of how I first came to make the distinction or why I said it was
important. I haven’t thought about the question, and offhand, in thinking about it, I really don’t know. It is a
distinction I made fairly early on..
Hammond: You made it early, and I’ve come to think that it may be one of the keys to your methodology and
perhaps…
Friedman: I suspect that came from Burns. That’s my guess; but I really couldn’t document it – because he was
so imbued with Marshall. You see, he was very much a disciple of Marshall on the one hand, and Wesley
Mitchell on the other. And Wesley Mitchell would have impelled in him aversion to the pure abstract Walrasian,
while Marshall would have impelled in him his problem-seeking approach. I suspect that that’s where it comes
from, but I really can’t say. That’s just pure rationalisation. (Hammond 1992: 226).14
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approach be considered fair and well-documented? Finally, how does his 1949 article relate to
his other pieces?
The alleged dominance of the Walrasian approach
Considering the time at which he was writing (the end of the 1940s), Friedman’s fierce attack
on the Walrasian approach is surprising. “We curtsy to Marshall but we walk with Walras” is
definitely a powerful image, but is it a correct account of what was going on? I doubt it.
At the time, Walras’s Elements had not been translated into English. Arrow and Debreu had
not started their collaboration. Only a few sources (e.g. Stigler (1941) and the works of Cassel
and Wicksell were available to economists who wished to become acquainted with Walrasian
theory while being unable to read French. Admittedly, a revival of Walrasian theory, triggered
by Hicks’s Value and Capital, was effectively under way. A few works of mathematical
economics had seen the light of day, led by authors such as Moore, Hotelling and Schultz.
Their aim, which could not but have looked odd to Walras, was to render the Walrasian
conceptual apparatus statistically operational. Thus, their perspective was poles apart from the
line pursued by Arrow, Debreu and Mackenzie, which I for one view as being more faithful to
Walras’s own methodological precepts. It is also true that Friedman was in direct contact with
some of the few Walrasian American economists and enjoyed many opportunities to confront
his views with them when attending seminars at the Cowles Commission.
Yet, all in all, these economists were a definite minority in the profession. Therefore,
Friedman’s image is totally inappropriate. At the time, the majority of economists were not
walking with Walras.
A fair portrait of the Walrasian approach?
The Lausanne economist would hardly have recognised his brainchild in Friedman’s sketchy
portrait. Take the statement that to Walras “facts are to be described, not explained”.
Assuming its meaning is clear, which is questionable, I do not see how it relates to Walras’s
methodology. Likewise, having Walras ranked as a defender of the realism of assumptions
looks odd. Ascribing to him the view that a “theory is to be tested by the accuracy of its
“assumptions”  as  photographic  descriptions  of  reality,  not  by  the  correctness  of  the
predictions  that  can  be  derived  from  it”  (Friedman  [1949] 1953:  91)  indicates  a  total
ignorance of his methodological principles. It is true that, unlike Friedman, Walras did not
believe that economic theory needed to be gauged by its predictive capacity. Yet, he never
viewed the realism of its assumptions as the criterion by which to assess it. Finally, another
indication of Friedman’s ignorance of Walrasian theory is his claim that Walras adhered to15
15
monopolistic competition and treated firms as monopolies. In fact, nothing was more alien to
Walras than such a view.
Furthermore, on reading Section V it is unclear whether Friedman had in mind that the
Marshallian and the Walrasian approaches were pursuing different purposes or whether he
indicted the Walrasian approach for having lapsed from some purpose that would have been
common to both of them. He started by asserting that they pursued different purposes. Yet,
when it came to documenting this difference, he shifted towards denouncing abstractness,
mathematical elegance and means becoming ends, all of which suggests that Walrasian theory
had derailed from the supposed common purpose of economic theory.
Even this derailment claim is poorly supported. Friedman’s opposition between mathematical
elegance and relevance has little grounding. While mathematical elegance has indeed been a
distinctive feature of neo-Walrasian theory  which, remember, had not seen the light of day
at this time  Walras’s own work can hardly be characterised in this way. If anything,
Walras’s mathematics was, as noted by Harrod (1956), “clumsy and tortuous”.
Friedman’s claim that the Marshall−Walras divide is not a matter of partial versus general
equilibrium
Can Friedman be taken at his word when he claims that Marshallian analysis is a fully fledged
general equilibrium theory? I do not think so.
The most plausible definition of general equilibrium analysis consists of stating that a model
can be considered as ‘general equilibrium’ as soon as its object of study is an entire economy
rather than a fraction of it. The immediate implication is that all models that fail to meet this
criterion must be considered as partial equilibrium models. The joint study of two markets
(for example the market for a given good and the markets for its inputs) constitutes partial
equilibrium even it is concerned with an interdependency phenomenon. As soon as this
definition is adhered to, the matter is settled: Marshallian analysis à la Friedman, centred on
the study of an industry, is partial equilibrium.
Unfortunately, Friedman refused this characterisation. The underlying reason, I believe, is a
matter of territorial claims. The term ‘general equilibrium’ has positive connotations of
completeness, while the term ‘partial equilibrium’ suggests an admission of incompleteness.
Hence the struggle to stop the Walrasian camp having a monopoly over the positively
connoted field
As soon as it is accepted that general equilibrium must be equated with the analysis of an
economy as a whole, Friedman’s stance can be ascertained unequivocally: he is against it. It
suffices to return to his comment on Christ’s assessment of the Klein model, where he argued16
16
that industry analysis has advantages of its own that are lost when the economy as a whole
becomes the object of study. Why wanting to brand the study of an industry as general
equilibrium analysis as if the lack of engaging in the latter type of work was an unbearable
stigma? Nothing but confusion is to be gained by such a semantic move.
As to Friedman’s claim that Marshall’s Mathematical Note XXI generalised his partial
equilibrium into a general equilibrium analysis, it breaks down as soon as the line between
general equilibrium and non-general equilibrium is drawn along the above line. Marshall’s
note is concerned with the phenomenon of joined and composite supply and demand. Clearly
an element of interdependency is involved. Yet widening the scope of the analysis from a
single market to a group of related markets cannot be viewed as tantamount to analysing the
entire economy. Likewise, the fact that Marshall wrote to John Bates Clark that all his life had
been devoted to giving flesh to this note should not be taken for more than it was, a




Three main lessons can be drawn from my survey. First, it is surprising to see how numerous
Friedman’s foes were at the time. The concepts or works that he disliked and felt the need to
attack ranged widely: indifferences curves, Hicksian demand theory, Schultz’s statistical
demand  curves,  econometric  models  aiming  at  representing  the  economy  as  a  whole,
monopolistic competition and Lange’s Keynesianism. All this conveys the image of Friedman
as an outcast, or at least as somebody fighting against the tide. Positively, he had one hero,
Marshall, and to him this meant three associated features: (a) the search for concrete truth and
an understanding of the ordinary business of life; (b) the need to focus on the study of
particular industries; and (c) the need to resort to concepts that were directly operational, i.e.
measurable. The second lesson is that Friedman seems to have believed that all the models he
disliked were ‘Walrasian’. The third lesson is the difference in tone between Friedman’s
criticism of Walrasian theory in his 1949 and 1955 articles. In the latter, he is still dismissive
of the Walrasian approach, but in a far less vehement way.
Two tasks ensue from these observations. The first is to assess whether there are good
grounds for characterising all the above models as Walrasian. That is, what might the
‘Walrasian’ modifier have meant for Friedman, and does his understanding of it stand up
retrospectively? The second is to elucidate his change in tone between 1949 and 1955.17
17
5. Friedman’s understanding of the ‘Walrasian’ modifier
As I see things, Friedman’s characterisation of Walrasian theory can be summarised in the
following four points:
1)  Walrasian theory aims at discovering fundamental principles governing abstract
economies.
2)  Walrasian models comprise theoretical concepts that have no direct measurable
counterparts.
3)  Empirical measurement and prediction-making and testing are no part of the research
programme.
4)  Walrasian models are concerned with the economy as a whole rather than with a part
of it, such as an industry.
5) The  Walrasian  approach  is  formalised;  whenever  necessary,  relevance  will  be
sacrificed to rigour.
16
On all these points, the Marshallian approach is supposed to stand in sharp contrast to the
Walrasian. Moreover, to Friedman, bringing out a contrast between the Marshallian and the
Walras approaches was tantamount to pleading for the superiority of the former over the
latter. So all the above features were considered by Friedman as flaws and reasons to
condemn any model which adopted them.
The question must be asked as to whether such a characterisation stands up to a retrospective
test – would a present-day defender of the Marshall-Walras divide agree with Friedman’s way
of putting the issue? As expected, the answer is not clear cut. Positively, Friedman’s
characterisation of the scope and aim of Walrasian theory is acceptable. Negatively, three
critical observations come to mind. First, Friedman insists too much on broad methodological
traits such as those above, failing to realise that the contrast between the two approaches is
also a matter of narrower methodological choices, the effect of which is to put the theoretical
construction on divergent tracks. These bear on the notion of equilibrium that is adopted, the
role of money, the trade organisation and information assumptions, the treatment of time,
etc.
17 Second, the fifth criterion, on which Friedman insisted, has failed to pass the test of
time. Accepting that game theoretical and industrial organisation models can be considered
neo-Marshallian, it has turned out that the Walrasian approach no longer has a monopoly over
                                       
16 Some further traits mentioned in Section V of Friedman (1949), such as the monopolistic nature of Walrasian
theory, have been dropped because they are patently mistaken.
17 On this, see De Vroey (1999a, 1999b, 2003).18
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formalisation. Finally, Friedman’s manicheist stance must also be questioned. In my opinion,
no one approach should be considered superior to another. They are rather alternative research
programmes, having each its pros and cons.
In order to qualify as Walrasian, a given model must abide by the above criteria.
18 Let me then
ask whether there are good reasons to consider the models criticised by Friedman as
Walrasian according to his own definition.
Hicks’ demand theory
Unlike Friedman (and myself), Hicks saw no fundamental reason for opposing Marshall and
Walras. To him, these two authors held complementary approaches (Hicks ([1934] 1983). He
viewed the study of the Marshallian market as a first step in the analysis of the economy as a
whole.
19 Be that as it may, separating the elements of Hicks’s Value and Capital book that are
Marshallian from those that are Walrasian is quite easy. The very fact that Part II of the book
is entitled ‘General equilibrium analysis’ indicates that Part I, entitled ‘The theory of
subjective value’, where Hicks develops his demand analysis, is not a general equilibrium
theory. In effect, Hicks’s recurrent reference in the chapters composing Part I of Value and
Capitalis Marshall. So Hicks’s demand theory analysis belongs to the Marshallian part of the
book rather than to its Walrasian part.
It may be argued that the fact that every commodity composing the economy is individually
listed in the Hicksian demand theory makes it Walrasian.
20 Yet this is not a sufficient
condition. For example, the category of income as understood by Hicks in these chapters – a
quantity of money that agents have at their disposal before entering the goods markets and
which accrued to them from their antecedent sale of inputs – has no place in a Walrasian
framework.
Finally, comparing Hicks’s demand theory with the set of conditions above, it turns out that it
abides by conditions (1), (2) and (3), but definitely not by condition (4).
To conclude, it is dubious whether the Hicksian demand theory can be characterised as
specifically Walrasian. Friedman’s dissatisfaction with it may well rest on a trait that he
associates  with  the  Walrasian  approach  – basing  the  analysis  on  concepts  having  no
observable counter-parts – yet this association is far from compelling. The dispute between
                                       
18 Henceforth, I will consider only the first four conditions, eliminating the fifth one.
19 “If a model of the whole economy is to be securely based, it must be grounded in an intelligent account of how
a single market functions’ (Hicks 1965: 78).
20 This is the step taken by Hirsch and de Marchi: “In comparing two demand curves, one of which he calls
Walrasian (the conventional one) and of which he refers to as Marshallian (constant real income) Friedman gives
us an example of how he applies the Marshallian-Walrasian distinction in a specific case” (1990: 23).19
19
Hicks and Friedman is one that takes place within the Marshallian partial equilibrium
framework rather than opposing the Walrasian and Marshallian approaches. As a result,
Friedman’s transition from the discussion of demand theory in Sections I to IV of the 1949
article, where he discusses demand theory, to Section V, devoted to the broader Marshall-
Walras contrast, is far from straightforward. While there is a link between these two parts of
the article, they are hardly part and parcel of each other. In fact, they could be split without
harming the argument in either.
Schultz
Schultz was an author who claimed to be part of the Walras-Pareto lineage while pursuing the
aim of making Walrasian concepts statistically measurable, a project that Walras would have
refused to consider as his. Be that as it may, Schultz cannot be considered Walrasian
according to Friedman’s criteria. His agenda fails to abide by conditions (1) and (3), and
possibly also condition (2). Friedman might have been expected to credit Schultz with having
breached the Walrasian reluctance to enter into empirical work, but this was not the case. In
Friedman’s eyes, something more than merely engaging in empirical work was needed,
namely that the empirical results exerted a feedback on the theoretical structure.
21
Moreover, Schultz’s work shows that there is many a slip ’twixt cup and lip. To achieve his
aim of measuring Walrasian concepts, Schultz had to go through many twists as, to give just
one  example,  his  transmogrification  of  the  Walrasian  notion  of  endowment  into  the
Marshallian notion of monetary income witnesses. While the theoretical and empirical parts
of Schultz’s paper and article are excellent contributions on their own, the link between them
is virtually non-existent.
22
To conclude, there is more to Friedman’s dislike of Schultz’s work than its Walrasian
character. Moreover, Schultz should not be considered a fully fledged Walrasian economist.
                                       
21 This is evidenced in a letter that Friedman wrote to Edwin Wilson in 1946 in which he criticised Schultz in the
following terms: “Schultz took the theory as fixed and given, and tried to measure what he thought were
essential functions in the theory. He imposed extremely high standards of care and thoroughness on  the
measurement process — but he nowhere attempted what seems to me the fundamental important task of
reformulating the theory so that it would really generalize the observable data; he also tried to wrench the data
into a pre-existing theoretical scheme, no matter how much of a wrench was required” (Stigler 1994: 1200).
22 This has led Mirowski and Hands to conclude that “it is seldom recognized that [Schultz’s] book is essentially
a swan song for Walrasian economics: Schultz bravely reported the empirical debacle in detail and then
produced a litany of excuses why things had not worked out as hoped” (1998: 264).20
20
Lange
Price Flexibility and Employment was an attempt to combine Walras and Keynes, two authors
to whom Friedman was strongly opposed. Was there then some domino process at work,
Friedman’s  dislike  of  Keynes  spilling  over  to  Walras?  Actually,  the  matter  is  more
complicated than that. Recall Friedman’s hailing of Keynes as a genuine Marshallian in
Section V of the 1949 article. In other words, while Friedman was opposed to Walrasian
theory because of its methodological principles, his opposition to Keynes had no such
groundings. Keynesian theory was to be rejected, not, like Walrasian theory, because of its
faulty methodological basis, but rather because it had been contradicted by empirical
evidence.
23 So, Friedman’s target in his criticism of Lange’s book is less the Keynesian than
the Walrasian element of the proposed Keynes−Walras alliance.
The irony here is that, while Walras’s name does not appear in Friedman’s review of Lange,
of all the authors attacked by Friedman he was the only one who really deserved the
Walrasian label. And, in effect, his theory abides by the criteria set up to this effect.
Triffin
Two reasons may explain Friedman’s hostility to Triffin’s project. First, it amounted to
shelving the study of industries. The second objection has a more ideological nature. Triffin
claimed that a deep affinity linked imperfect competition and Walrasian general equilibrium,
to the effect that a synthesis between them was within reach.. This could not but displease
Friedman on the ground of a bedfellows argument – any friend of any enemy must also be an
enemy. Friedman did not question Triffin’s co-optation of Walrasian theory. Saddled with
such a bedfellow, Walrasian theory could hardly look congenial to him. However, what he
failed to see was that the synthesis between Chamberlin and Walras evoked by Triffin was
just wishful thinking. Triffin’s thesis hardly took the first step towards constructing such a
                                       
23 The following extract from Friedman’s Theoretical Framework for Monetary Analysis makes this clear:
“Keynes was no Walrasian seeking, like Patinkin and to a lesser extent Tobin, a general and abstract system of
all-embracing simultaneous equations. He was a Marshallian, an empirical scientist seeking a simple, fruitful
hypothesis. And his was a new, bold, and imaginative hypothesis, whose virtue was precisely how much it could
say about major problems on the basis of so little. Of course, his assumptions were not in literal correspondence
with reality. If they had been, he would have been condemned to pedestrian description; his whole theory would
have lost its power. Of course, he could be wrong. There is no point to any scientific theory that cannot be. The
greater the range of evidence that, if observed, would contradict a theory, the more precise are its predictions and
the better a theory is provided it is not, in fact, contradicted. I believe that Keynes’ theory is the right kind of
theory in its simplicity, its concentration on a few key magnitudes, its potential fruitfulness. I have been led to
reject it, not on these grounds, but because I believe that it has been contradicted by evidence: its predictions
have not been confirmed by experience. The failure suggests that it has not isolated what are ‘really’ the key
factors in short-run economic change” (Friedman 1974: 134).21
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synthesis. If the Marshall-Walras divide makes sense, it would be better to put monopolistic
competition on Marshall’s side (as argued in De Vroey, 2004).
*
* *
The general lesson to be drawn from this quick assessment is that, with the exception of
Lange, the reasons for Friedman’s dissatisfaction with the models he rejects actually have
little to do with their alleged Walrasian character.
6. The relationship Friedman 1949 account of the Marshall-Walras divide and his
review of Jaffé’s translation of Walras’ Elements
Finally, let me compare the 1949 article with the 1955 review. While the former is virulent,
the latter, although still dismissive, is milder in tone. In particular, the Jaffé review improves
on the 1949 article by bringing out the difference in purpose between Marshall and Walras
more satisfactorily. Walras is no longer assessed through a Marshallian lens. The specificity
of his project is recognised.
Two factors may be evoked to explain the difference between the 1949 and the 1955 articles.
A first one is the bad company explanation. Yet, as seen, it played only for the imperfect
competition/ Walrasian theory connection. In 1949, Friedman might still have believed that
Triffin  was  right  in  arguing  that  Walrasian  theory  and  imperfect  competition  were
compatible.
24 At the time, he had only an indirect knowledge of Walrasian theory while the
works against which he felt it necessary to react were claiming a Walrasian affiliation.
Professor Blaug’s testimony can be called in support of this view, as he has written to me that
Friedman  told  him  that  the  first  time  he  read  Walras  was  when  he  reviewed  Jaffe’s
translation.
25 Once Walras’s Elements became available in English, Friedman realised that
Walrasian theory did not carry the associations which Triffin and Lange had wanted to
impose upon it. It was still not his cup of tea, but at least he recognised its specificity and was
ready to give it due credit.
The second factor relates to the political dimension evoked in the introduction. On the one
hand, the Cowles Commission had left Chicago. On the other hand, the socialist debate had
                                       
24 An extract from Hammond (2003) is worth quoting in this respect for it reveals that Friedman’s mistake is still
being made: “So the impetus of Friedman’s discussion of methodology with George Stigler was the challenge
posed by Walrasian  monopolistic  competition to Marshallian industry analysis” (2003: 16; my emphasis).
Treading  in  Friedman’s  footsteps,  Hammond  wrongly  takes  it  for  granted  that  Walrasian  monopolistic
competition existed and raised a challenge to Marshallians.
25 This point was confirmed to me by Professor Friedman in private correspondence.22
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petered out, and on reading Walras’s Elements, Friedman must quite rightly have discovered
that no plea in favour of socialism was to be found in it.
7. Concluding remarks
My aim in this paper has been to assess the validity of Friedman’s claim, made in his 1949
article, as to the existence of a Marshall−Walras divide. I have shown that Friedman’s
arguments in favour of it stand up to scrutiny only partially. I have also put forward the view
that when he criticised specific models for their Walrasian flaws he might have had in mind
other targets for which the Walrasian label served as a proxy. The change in tone, from a
vehement to a softer anti-Walrasian stance, between Friedman’s 1949 article and his 1955
review of Jaffé’s translation of Walras’s Elements of Pure Economics has also been brought
out. While keeping his Marshallian affiliation, he followed Stigler to a position combining
praise for Walras’s achievement with the conviction that it was not the right line to take.
Thus, to my mind, the 1955 article is a better embodiment of Friedman’s definitive view as to
the relationship between Marshall and Walras than the 1949 article.
My judgement that Friedman’s justification of the Marshall−Walras divide was unsatisfactory
should not be taken as meaning that he was wrong in believing that the two approaches were
poles apart. On the contrary, he should be credited for having blazed the trail for the
recognition of this divide, which in my opinion constitutes a clue for understanding the
development of economic theory over the last century. He was right in perceiving the need to
draw the Marshall-Walras divide yet unable to give a solid argumentation as to its grounding.
The task ahead is to fill in this lacuna.
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